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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
The plaintiffs, shareholders in several investment 
companies, filed an interlocutory appeal of the District 
Court's dismissal of their state law claims for br each of 
fiduciary duty and deceit. They claim that the District 
Court erred in concluding that these claims ar e preempted 
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by S 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as 
amended (ICA). Because we conclude that the claims are 
not preempted, we will reverse their dismissal and remand 




The plaintiffs are shareholders in seven investment 
companies, the named defendants in this action: 
MuniEnhanced Fund, Inc., MuniVest Fund II, Inc., 
MuniYield Fund, Inc., MuniYield Insur ed Fund, Inc., 
MuniYield Insured Fund II, Inc., MuniY ield Quality Fund, 
Inc., and MuniYield Quality Fund II, Inc. (the Funds). The 
plaintiffs invested more than $44,000 in the Funds between 
May 22 and October 18, 1995. The named plaintif f, Jack 
Green, has brought suit individually and in his capacity as 
a trustee of seven trusts that invested in the Funds. The 
other plaintiffs, Lawrence P. Belden and Stanley Simon, sue 
solely as trustees of trusts that invested in the Funds. 
Although not named in the caption, the complaint also 
identifies as plaintiffs seven trusts that allegedly purchased 
shares of the Funds. The plaintiffs have brought the case 
as a putative class action, seeking to repr esent more than 
100,000 investors in the Funds. 
 
The Funds are closed-end investment companies, which 
are registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and publicly traded on the New Y ork 
Stock Exchange. All of the Funds are incorporated under 
the laws of Maryland and have their principal places of 
business in Plainsboro, New Jersey. By investing in long- 
term tax-exempt municipal bonds, the Funds' aim is to 
provide shareholders with income that is exempt from 
federal income taxes and to increase retur n to shareholders 
through the use of leverage. The Funds gain leverage by 
issuing shares of preferred stock that pay dividends based 
upon prevailing short-term interest rates and investing the 
proceeds from the sale of this preferred stock in longer- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because the facts of this case are not in dispute, the factual 
background that follows is taken largely from an earlier District Court 
opinion in this case. See Green v. Fund Asset Management, 19 F. Supp. 
2d 227 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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term obligations that, under normal market conditions, pay 
higher rates. As long as there is a spr ead between the 
short-term rates paid by the Funds to holders of the 
preferred stock and the longer-ter m rates received by the 
Funds from investments, the fund managers ar e able to 
provide the shareholders with higher yields. 
 
Defendant Fund Asset Management, L.P., (F AM) serves as 
the Funds' investment adviser and is responsible for 
managing the Funds' investment portfolios and pr oviding 
administrative services to the Funds. Pursuant to written 
investment advisory agreements, the Funds pay F AM a fee 
for its services based upon a percentage of the Funds' 
weekly net assets. The MuniEnhanced Fund, Inc., 
prospectus describes its advisory fee as follows: 
 
       For the services provided by the Investment Adviser 
       [FAM] under the Investment Advisory Agr eement, the 
       Fund will pay a monthly fee at an annual rate of .50 of 
       1% of the Fund's average weekly net assets (i.e. , the 
       average weekly value of the total assets of the Fund, 
       minus the sum of accrued liabilities of the Fund and 
       accumulated dividends on the shares of pr eferred 
       stock). For purposes of this calculation, average weekly 
       net assets is determined at the end of each month on 
       the basis of the average net assets of the Fund for each 
       week during the month. 
 
Green v. Fund Asset Management, 19 F . Supp. 2d 227, 229 
(D.N.J. 1998) (Green I).2  
 
Defendant Merrill Lynch Asset Management, L.P ., (MLAM) 
is an affiliate of FAM. MLAM and FAM are organized under 
the laws of Delaware and have their principal places of 
business in Plainsboro, New Jersey. Defendant Princeton 
Services, Inc., (PSI), a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Plainsboro, New Jersey, is the 
general partner of FAM and MLAM. PSI has a 1% interest 
in FAM and MLAM. Defendant Merrill Lynch and Co., Inc., 
is FAM's and MLAM's sole limited partner and has a 99% 
interest in FAM and MLAM. Merrill L ynch is a publicly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The prospectuses for the other Funds contain virtually identical 
disclosures. 
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traded holding company that provides global investment, 
financing, insurance, and related services through its 
subsidiaries and affiliates. Merrill Lynch is a Delaware 
corporation with corporate headquarters in New Y ork City. 
 
Defendant Arthur Zeikel is the President and a director of 
each of the Funds, President and Chief Investment Officer 
of MLAM and FAM, President and a dir ector of PSI, and an 
Executive Vice President of Merrill L ynch. Defendant Terry 
Glenn is the Executive Vice President of each of the Funds 
and Executive Vice President of F AM and MLAM. 
 
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated (MLPFS), a securities broker -dealer and 
investment bank, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Merrill 
Lynch. MLPFS served as the principal underwriter for the 
offerings of the Funds' common stock. MLPFS has also 
entered into auction agent agreements with the Funds to 
sell the Funds' preferred stock. The 1994 MuniYield 
Insured Fund, Inc., annual statement describes the fees 
generated by the preferred stock auctions as follows: 
 
       The Fund pays commissions to certain broker -dealers 
       at the end of each auction at an annual rate ranging 
       from 0.25% to 0.375%, calculated on the pr oceeds of 
       each auction. For the year ended October 31, 1994, 
       MLPFS, an affiliate of FAMI [FAM's predecessor], 
       received $591,736 as commissions. 
 
Id.3 MLPFS is a Delawar e corporation and maintains its 
corporate headquarters in New York City. 
 
The plaintiffs brought this action seeking to remedy 
alleged violations of state law and of S 36(b) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (the ICA), codified at 15 
U.S.C. S 80a-35(b).4 In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that 
defendants breached their disclosure obligations and 
fiduciary duties under the ICA and under state law. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Each of the Funds' annual statements contains virtually identical 
disclosures. 
 
4. Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in the United States 
District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts on June 21, 1996. Defendants 
filed a motion to transfer the case to the District of New Jersey pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1404 and the motion for transfer was granted. 
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plaintiffs contend that the defendants "failed to explicitly or 
sufficiently disclose" that the calculation of FAM's 
management fee would include assets purchased with the 
proceeds from the sale of preferr ed stock. They claim that 
because the advisory fee is measured as a per centage of the 
Funds' capitalization, including leverage, ther e is a strong 
financial incentive for FAM to keep the Funds fully 
leveraged at all times, even when it would be in the best 
interest of shareholders to reduce or eliminate leverage. The 
plaintiffs contend that FAM would lose approximately one- 
third of its advisory compensation if it eliminated leverage. 
They argue that the fee arrangement cr eates an inherent 
conflict of interest, which was not disclosed in the Funds' 
prospectuses, the Funds' filings with the SEC, or the 
Funds' periodic reports to the shareholders. The plaintiffs 
also allege that the defendants failed to disclose that the 
issuing of the preferred stock was subject to a conflict of 
interest; they find this conflict in the fact that FAM's 
affiliate, MLPFS, received fees from the sale of the preferred 
stock. In addition, plaintiffs claim that the defendants have 
continually misled investors with respect to the advisory 
fees, which are ultimately paid by the Funds' shareholders. 
 
The plaintiffs seek both compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief. They ask for an order permanently 
enjoining the defendants from entering into any 
compensation arrangement between the Funds and any 
investment adviser under which "the compensation payable 
to such investment advisor is determined by, dependent 
upon, or measured or influenced by, the amount of 
financial leverage of its common equity investment 
maintained by such fund." Green I, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 230 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The defendants filed a motion, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(c), to dismiss the plaintiffs' state law 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and deceit. The 
defendants contend that the plaintiffs' state law claims are 
preempted by S 36(b) of the ICA, which cr eates a federal, 
private right of action for breach of fiduciary duty by an 
investment adviser or mutual fund management company 
with respect to payment and compensation for services. The 
District Court granted the defendants' motion and 
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dismissed the plaintiffs' state law claims. The District Court 
did acknowledge, however, that the question presented, i.e., 
whether S 36(b) of the ICA preempts the plaintiffs' state law 
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and deceit, was a close 
one and a question of first impression in the courts of 
appeals. For that reason, the District Court permitted the 
plaintiffs to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b). Green v. Fund Asset Management, 53 F. 
Supp. 2d 723, 731-32 (D.N.J. 1999) (Green II). 
 
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' 
federal claim under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. The District Court 
had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims under 
28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). 
 
We have plenary review of the District Court's order 
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(c). See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Portlight, Inc., 188 F.3d 93, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1999). We must 
"view the facts presented in the pleadings and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the . . . non-moving party." Institute for Scientific Info., 
Inc. v. Gordon & Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 
1002, 1004 (3d Cir. 1991). We will affirm the District 
Court's judgment only if the plaintiffs would not be entitled 
to relief under any set of facts that could be proved. See 




The question we must answer on this appeal is as 
follows: Does state law (in this case, common law 
establishing liability for breach of fiduciary duty and deceit) 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives which Congr ess had in 
mind in enacting S 36(b) of the ICA? 
 
Defendants argue that S 36(b) of the ICA, codified at 15 
U.S.C. S 80a-35(b), preempts the plaintif fs' state law claims 
for breach of fiduciary duty and deceit. Section 36(b) is a 
 
                                8 
  
lengthy and detailed statutory provision. It pr ovides that an 
investment adviser of a registered investment company has 
a fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for services. 
An action may be brought in district court by a security 
holder of the registered investment company against the 
investment adviser for breach of that fiduciary duty 
regarding compensation. In such an action, it is not 
necessary to allege or prove personal misconduct on the 
part of any defendant.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The full text of 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b) provides: 
 
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a 
registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty 
with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments 
of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by 
the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated 
person of such investment adviser. An action may be brought under this 
subsection by the Commission, or by a security holder of such registered 
investment company on behalf of such company, against such 
investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment adviser, 
or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has 
a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach 
of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by 
such registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to 
such investment adviser or person. With r espect to any such action the 
following provisions shall apply: 
 
       (1) It shall not be necessary to allege or pr ove that any 
defendant 
       engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintif f shall have the 
       burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
       (2) In any such action approval by the boar d of directors of such 
       investment company of such compensation or payments, or of 
       contracts or other arrangements providing for such 
       compensation or payments, and ratification or appr oval of such 
       compensation or payments, or of contracts or other 
       arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by 
       the shareholders of such investment company, shall be given 
       such consideration by the court as is deemed appr opriate under 
       all the circumstances. 
 
       (3) No such action shall be brought or maintained against any 
       person other than the recipient of such compensation or 
       payments, and no damages or other relief shall be granted 
       against any person other than the recipient of such 
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In order to determine whether S 36(b) preempts the 
plaintiffs' state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and 
deceit, we must first determine what pr eemption theory is 
applicable. Federal law preempts, and ther eby displaces, 
state law in three different situations: (1) "express 
preemption," (2) "field preemption" (which is also sometimes 
referred to as "implied preemption"), or (3) "conflict 
preemption." See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
189 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 
Preemption is "express" when ther e is an explicit 
statutory command that state law be displaced. See 
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 504 U.S. 374, 382 
(1992). An example of express preemption can be found in 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) which states that the provisions of that Act "shall 
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(a). See Orson, 189 F.3d at 381. Preemption is 
"implied," and state law may be displaced,"if federal law so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       compensation or payments. No award of damages shall be 
       recoverable for any period prior to one year before the action 
       was instituted. Any award of damages against such recipient 
       shall be limited to the actual damages resulting from the breach 
       of fiduciary duty and shall in no event exceed the amount of 
       compensation or payments received from such investment 
       company, or the security holders thereof, by such recipient. 
 
       (4) This subsection shall not apply to compensation or payments 
       made in connection with transactions subject to section 80a-17 
       of this title, or rules, regulations, or or ders thereunder, or to 
       sales loads for the acquisition of any security issued by a 
       registered investment company. 
 
       (5) Any action pursuant to this subsection may be brought only in 
       an appropriate district court of the United States. 
 
       (6) No finding by a court with respect to a breach of fiduciary 
duty 
       under this subsection shall be made a basis (A) for a finding of 
       a violation of this subchapter for the purposes of sections 80a- 
       9 and 80a-48 of this title, section 78o of this title, or section 
       80b-3 of this title, or (B) for an injunction to pr ohibit any 
       person from serving in any of the capacities enumerated in 
       subsection (a) of this section. 
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thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congr ess left no room for the 
States to supplement it." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Finally, as we stated in Orson, state law may be 
displaced under conflict preemption principles if the state 
law in question presents a conflict with federal law in one 
of two situations: when it is impossible to comply with both 
the state and the federal law, or when the state law"stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress." Orson, 189 F.3d 
at 382 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 
525 (1977)). 
 
In this case, the defendants do not contend thatS 36(b) 
expressly preempts the plaintiffs' state law claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and deceit,6 nor do they assert that 
S 36(b) of the ICA, or even the entire ICA itself, impliedly 
preempts these claims.7 The preemption theory that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The defendants would be precluded fr om making such an argument 
because neither S 36(b), nor any other section of the ICA, contains an 
"explicit statutory command" indicating that federal law preempts and 
thereby displaces state law. 
 
7. The defendants would be precluded fr om making such an argument 
since it is well-settled that neither the ICA alone nor all federal 
securities 
laws taken together occupy the field of corporate law or securities law. 
See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979) (discussing the ICA 
and noting that while "in certain areas[the Supreme Court has] held 
that federal statutes authorize the federal courts to fashion a complete 
body of federal law, [c]orporation law . . . is not such an area"); Baker, 
Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F .2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(en banc) ("It is well-settled that federal law does not enjoy complete 
preemptive force in the field of securities[; s]tate securities laws exist 
in 
every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and, `far from 
preempting the field,' Congress has expr essly preserved the role of the 
states in securities regulation.") (citations omitted). Such state 
securities 
laws are commonly referred to in the securities industry as "Blue Skies" 
laws. The instant case, moreover, is distinguishable from the recent 
decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, No. 98-1768, 
2/21/01, ___ U.S. ___ (2001), ___ S.Ct. ___ (2001), in which the Supreme 
Court found state common law fraud claims relating to a medical device 
impliedly preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. Although the Buckman Court acknowledged that 
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defendants claim is applicable is conflict pr eemption. In 
doing so, the defendants do not argue that"it is impossible 
to comply with both the state and federal law." 8 Instead, 
they assert the other prong of conflict pr eemption: that 
state law in this case "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress." The District Court was persuaded 
by the defendants' arguments and dismissed the claims, 
concluding that they were preempted byS 36(b) under the 
theory of "conflict preemption." W e conclude, however, that, 
when plaintiffs' state law claims are pr operly analyzed 
under the Supreme Court's "conflict pr eemption" 
jurisprudence, they are not preempted byS 36(b). 
 
In arguing for conflict preemption, the defendants have 
attempted to analogize this case to earlier cases. However, 
as the District Court recognized, none of the cases they cite 
are controlling; the cited cases dealt with the proposition 
that, with respect to other sections of the ICA, S 36(b) is the 
exclusive remedy for grievances concerning mutual fund 
service fees. Green II, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29 (citing 
numerous cases). The District Court also corr ectly noted 
that, while "defendants cite the unpublished decision in 
Batra v. Investors Research Corp., No. 89-0528-CV-W-6, 
1990 WL 165242 (W.D. Mo. May 3, 1990), and a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
a presumption against federal preemption of a state law cause of action 
exists when a field is traditionally occupied by the states, the fraud 
action was not subject to such a presumption because the defendant 
manufacturer was accused of making fraudulent r epresentations to the 
Food and Drug Administration during the course of the product approval 
process. The Court held that the prevention of fraud against federal 
agencies cannot be regarded as a field traditionally occupied by the 
states. Buckman, ___ U.S. ___ at___. Unlike the plaintiffs in Buckman, 
the plaintiffs in the case at bar allege not fraud against a federal 
agency, 
but rather violations of state and federal securities laws. 
 
8. The defendants would be precluded fr om making such an argument 
because no direct conflict exists between state law and federal law in 
this case. Cf., e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 
U.S. 132, 143 (1963) ("That would be the situation here if, for example, 
the federal orders forbade the picking and marketing of any avocado 
testing more than 7% oil, which the Califor nia test excluded from the 
State any avocado measuring less than 8% oil content."). 
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subsequent unpublished decision in a related case, Batra v. 
Investors Research Corp., No. 91-0190-CV -W-6, 1992 WL 
280790 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 1992) (" Batra II"), as authority for 
their preemption argument, . . . these decisions concern the 
exercise of pendent jurisdiction[, and n]either decision 
expressly holds that Section 36(b) preempts state common 
law remedies." Id. at 729 (citing several cases). 
 
The plaintiffs and the defendants have also attempted to 
analogize this case to several Supreme Court pr eemption 
cases, all of which address the issue of "express 
preemption," not "conflict preemption," and thus are 
inapposite. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 
280, 284 (1995); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux , 481 U.S. 41, 
45-48 (1987); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 
531-33 (1977). 
 
We conclude that prior case law is not on point. We are 
left, therefore, to determine, guided by the Supreme Court's 
"conflict preemption" jurisprudence, whether state law, 
specifically common law establishing liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty and deceit, "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress" as set forth inS 36(b) of the ICA. 
 
The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that, 
when analyzing preemption issues, "because the States are 
independent Sovereigns in our federal system, we have long 
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state- 
law causes of action." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485-86 (1996). We start with an assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States will not be pr eempted 
unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress." Id. Moreover , in making our analysis, the 
"purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every 
pre-emption case." Id. (inter nal quotation marks omitted). 
See, e.g., Chicago & Northwestern T ransp. Co. v. Kalo Brick 
& Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1981); New York State 
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Onondaga County Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 413 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1973); Florida Lime & 
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1963). 
 
Thus, in deciding whether state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
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purposes and objectives of Congress, as set forth in S 36(b), 
we must focus on and attempt to discern the intent of 
Congress in enacting S 36(b). Further more, because S 36(b) 
represents congressional legislation in a field which the 
States have traditionally occupied9 -- tort actions for 
breach of fiduciary duty and fraud -- we must, as the 
Court stated in Medtronic, "start with the assumption that 
the historic police powers of the States," in this case the 
power of states to hold investment company management 
liable for improper compensation arrangements,"were not 
to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress." Medtr onic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 
In arguing that state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress," and thus that the plaintiffs' state 
law claims "conflict" with and are pr eempted by S 36(b), the 
defendants rely heavily upon and quote extensively from 
the legislative history of S 36(b) of the ICA. Because 
congressional intent is "the ultimate touchstone in every 
pre-emption case," we will examine that legislative history 
to discern the intent of Congress in enacting S 36(b). 
 
In its own review of the legislative history, the District 
Court found that "Congress enacted the ICA because it had 
concluded that the nationwide activities of investment 
companies called for federal regulation and, more relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. See, e.g., Baggett v. First National Bank, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th 
Cir. 1997) ("[C]auses of action for br eaches of fiduciary duties are 
traditionally creatures of state law, and under Cort, it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action for such based solely on federal 
law."); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 962 (3d Cir. 1990) 
("The complaint asserted claims pursuant to section 11 of the Securities 
Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5, 
and common law fraud and deceit."); Pin v. T exaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448, 
1452 (5th Cir. 1986) ("As to Texaco, the complaint alleges nothing more 
than corporate mismanagement and breaches offiduciary duty that are 
traditionally a matter of state regulation."); Data Probe Acquisition 
Corp. 
v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir . 1983) ("The gravamen of the 
claim 
advanced here is a breach of management'sfiduciary duty to 
shareholders, a matter traditionally committed to state law, which, if 
entertained, would unquestionably embark us on a course leading to a 
federal common law of fiduciary obligations."). 
 
                                14 
  
to the issue at hand, enacted Section 36(b) because the 
existing remedies for improper compensation arrangements 
had been ineffective." Green II , 53 F. Supp. 2d at 730. We 
agree with this conclusion. A careful survey of the relevant 
legislative history clearly and unequivocally indicates that 
Congress enacted S 36(b) because it deter mined that 
existing remedies for improper compensation arrangements 
were inadequate to protect mutual fund investors. 
 
The District Court quoted the Senate Report, 
accompanying the final version of the 1970 Amendments, 
which states that "the unique structure of mutual funds 
has made it difficult for the courts to apply traditional 
fiduciary standards in considering questions concerning 
management fees." S. REP. NO. 91-184 (1970), reprinted in 
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4898 (Senate Report). Id. at 727- 
28. The court then added that the "Senate Report . . . noted 
that the provisions contained in the ICA as originally 
passed in 1940 concerning the regulation of management 
fees and other charges to the investor `did not provide any 
mechanism by which the fairness of management contracts 
could be tested in court'." Id., quoting Senate Report at 
4901. The Senate Report went on to conclude that under 
general rules of law, advisory contracts that had been 
ratified by the shareholders or approved by disinterested 
directors could not be upset except upon a showing of 
"corporate waste": 
 
       As one court put it, the fee must "Shock the conscience 
       of the court." Such a rule may not be an impr oper one 
       when the protections of arm's-length bar gaining are 
       present. But in the mutual fund industry wher e, these 
       marketplace forces are not likely to operate as 
       effectively, your committee has decided that the 
       standard of "corporate waste" is unduly r estrictive and 
       recommends that it be changed. Id. 
 
The District Court then cited the conclusion in the 
Senate Report that the express statutory r equirement of 
"reasonableness" be eliminated and a specific "fiduciary 
duty" be "imposed on mutual fund investment advisers with 
respect to management fee compensation." Green II, 53 
F.Supp. 2d at 728 (citing Senate Report at 4902). The 
"fiduciary duty" standard would make it easier for a 
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shareholder to prevail in an action against an investment 
adviser who had entered into an improper or unfair 
compensation arrangement.10 
 
The defendants acknowledge that Congress enacted 
S 36(b) and implemented the "breach offiduciary duty" 
standard because it concluded that the "corporate waste" 
standard previously applied in most states was largely 
ineffective in preventing improper compensation 
arrangements. However, neither the District Court nor the 
defendants point to any language, either in the legislative 
history of S 36(b) or in the statute itself, that suggests that 
Congress intended to preempt state law claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty or deceit when it enacted S 36(b). 
 
Because Congress had found that the "corporate waste" 
standard was inadequate to meet the problem, it sought to 
provide mutual fund shareholders with additional 
protection from improper compensation arrangements. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the prior remedy might be less 
effective does not mean that it stands as an obstacle to "the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objective of Congress." Even though the common law is less 
effective than S 36(b), it may still be the remedy of choice in 
certain situations. The creation of a gr eater protection does 
not mean that the lesser protection is an obstacle if a 
complainant elects to employ it. Moreover , the "lesser 
protection," even if it is more difficult for a complainant to 
prove a breach of the standard of car e, may offer a greater 
range of targets and of remedies. Defendants have not 
demonstrated that Congress intended to eliminate common 
law access to these targets or these r emedies. 
 
Our conclusion that S 36(b) does not pr eempt the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Inherent in the discussion of br each of fiduciary duty vs. corporate 
waste is the concept that stockholder ratification or disinterested 
director approval of an advisory contract eliminated the breach of 
fiduciary duty standard in an attack on the terms of the advisory 
contract. See, e.g., Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962) (holding 
that where stockholders ratified investment adviser contract, interested 
parties were relieved of burden of pr oving fairness of transaction; under 
corporate waste standard, plaintiffs had not sustained burden of 
establishing that fees were legally excessive.) 
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plaintiffs' state law claims is reinfor ced by cases, involving 
other aspects of corporate governance, which hold that the 
presence of a federal remedy to relieve a problem does not 
preclude the recourse to a common law r emedy which is 
directed at the same problem. An example is CTS Corp. v. 
Dynamics, Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), a securities 
law/corporate law case discussing the potential pr eemptive 
effect of the Williams Act. In holding that the Williams Act 
did not preempt an Indiana state law r egulating corporate 
takeovers, the Court stated: 
 
        The Indiana Act operates on the assumption, implicit 
       in the Williams Act, that independent shar eholders 
       faced with tender offers often are at a disadvantage. By 
       allowing such shareholders to vote as a gr oup, the Act 
       protects them from the coercive aspects of some tender 
       offers. . . . In such a situation under the Indiana Act, 
       the shareholders as a group, acting in the corporation's 
       best interest, could reject the of fer, although individual 
       shareholders might be inclined to accept it. The desire 
       of the Indiana Legislature to protect shareholders of 
       Indiana corporations from this type of coer cive offer 
       does not conflict with the Williams Act. Rather, it 
       furthers the federal policy of investor protection. 
 
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 82-83 (emphasis added). 
 
This conclusion can be stated in another way: The 
creation of a federal remedy, in the field of securities law, 
does not necessarily eradicate existing state law r emedies 
or require that the federal remedy be exclusive. See, e.g., 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-501 (1996) 
(holding that S 360(k) of the Medical Device Amendments of 
1976 does not preempt overlapping state tort law). 
 
The defendants contend, nevertheless, that the strict 
limitations of S 36(b) demonstrate that the plaintiffs' state 
law claims should be preempted. The defendants point out 
that, unlike the plaintiffs' state law claims: 
 
       (1) Section 36(b) expressly limits the parties against 
       whom relief can be sought, see 15 U.S.C. S 80a- 
       35(b)(3) (2000);11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. While S 36(b) authorizes suit only against the "recipient" of the 
alleged excessive compensation and expressly forbids bringing suit 
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       (2) Section 36(b) limits the type and amount of r elief 
       a shareholder may recover, see id.;12 
 
       (3) Section 36(b) precludes shareholders from suing 
       for advisory fees paid more than one year prior to 
       the filing of the complaint, see id.; 13 
 
       (4) Section 36(b) imposes upon the plaintif f the 
       burden of proving that the investment adviser 
       breached his or her fiduciary duty, see  15 U.S.C. 
       S 80a-35(b)(1);14 
 
       (5) Section 36(b) requires plaintif fs to bring suit in 
       federal district court, see 15 U.S.C. S 80a-35(b)(5);15 
 
       (6) Section 36(b) creates no cause of action for the 
       investment fund itself--only the Securities and 
       Exchange Commission and shareholders of the 
       investment fund may bring suit against an 
       investment adviser for breach of fiduciary duty;16 
       and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
against other parties, the plaintiffs in this case have sued numerous 
parties under state law, many of which are not"recipient[s]" (as defined 
by S 36(b)) of the alleged excessive compensation. 
 
12. Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages with respect to their 
state law claims. 
 
13. As the District Court noted, this one-year statute of limitations is 
significantly shorter than the corresponding six-year statute of 
limitations for common law breach of fiduciary duty claims brought 
under New Jersey law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2A:14-1 (West 1999). 
 
14. As the District Court noted, under the common law, a fiduciary who 
allegedly breached his or her fiduciary duty must justify his or her 
conduct. See, e.g., Gedes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 
599 (1921). 
 
15. A plaintiff seeking to bring a br each of fiduciary duty claim under 
state law would not have to bring his claim in federal district court and 
indeed would be unable to bring his claim in federal district court unless 
jurisdiction was provided for under 28 U.S.C.S 1367 (supplemental 
jurisdiction) or 28 U.S.C. S 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). 
 
16. At common law, the shareholder's suit for breach of fiduciary duty is 
a derivative suit; the shareholder's right to bring suit is derived from 
the 
corporation's right to bring suit. 
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       (7) At least one Court of Appeals has concluded that 
       S 36(b) creates an equitable cause of action and 
       thus plaintiffs suing under S 36(b) ar e not entitled 
       to a jury trial, see Krinsk v. Fund Asset 
       Management, Inc., 875 F.2d 404, 414 (2d Cir. 
       1989).17 
 
Focusing on these procedural differ ences between a 
common law cause of action and one under S 36(b), the 
defendants reason that the differ ences reflect Congress's 
intent to preempt state law claims and, as a consequence, 
demonstrate that state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress." If, however , procedural differences 
were sufficient both to indicate congr essional intent to 
preempt overlapping state law and to demonstrate that 
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress," 
federal law would preempt overlapping state law every time 
federal law did not exactly mirror all  the state law or state 
laws in question. This argument finds no support in 
relevant federal case law and is actually contrary to the 
Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence. See, e.g., 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996); Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 
(1963). In short, establishing that federal law overlaps state 
law is, by itself, insufficient to establish that federal law 
preempts state law. 
 
Indeed, if we were to accept the defendants' ar gument 
that procedural differences both indicate congressional 
intent to preempt the plaintiffs' state law claims and 
demonstrate that state law "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress," then the '33 Act and the '34 Act 
would also, by definition, preempt much state law in the 
areas of corporate and securities law since many of the 
procedural and substantive requirements of the '33 Act and 
the '34 act differ markedly from the corr esponding 
procedural and substantive requirements of corporate and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Presumably, a plaintiff seeking damages for common law fraud or 
deceit is entitled to a jury trial. 
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securities law in most states. However, as noted above, it is 
well-settled that the '33 Act and the '34 Act do not preempt 
overlapping state law except where the overlapping state 
law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress" or 
where it is impossible to comply with both state and the 
federal law. The '33 Act and the '34 Act are just two of 
many possible examples of federal laws that do not 
generally preempt overlapping state law. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Medtronic in r egard to the potential 
preemptive effect of S 360(k) of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976: 
 
        Nothing in S 360(k) denies Florida the right to provide 
       a traditional damages remedy for violations of 
       common-law duties when those duties parallel federal 
       requirements. Even if it may be necessary as a matter 
       of Florida law to prove that those violations were the 
       result of negligent conduct, or that they cr eated an 
       unreasonable hazard for users of the pr oduct, such 
       additional elements of the state-law cause of action 
       would make the state requirements narr ower, not 
       broader, than the federal requir ement. While such a 
       narrower requirement might be"different from" the 
       federal rules in a literal sense, such a dif ference would 
       surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption 
       of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule. 
       The presence of a damages remedy does not amount to 
       the additional or different "r equirement" that is 
       necessary under the statute; rather, it mer ely provides 
       another reason for manufacturers to comply with 
       identical existing "requirements" under federal law. 
 
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 495 (emphasis added). 
 
In this case, as in Medtronic, we ar e presented with 
overlapping state and federal laws that impose dif ferent 
procedural requirements upon plaintif fs seeking to bring 
suit. However, here, as in Medtr onic, state law furthers "the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress." Neither the language of S 36(b) nor 
the accompanying legislative history indicates, or even 
suggests, that the plaintiffs' state law claims stand "as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
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purpose and objectives of Congress."18 This fact is fatal to 
the defendants' preemption arguments, especially in light of 
the presumption against preemption in situations where 
Congress has "legislated . . . in a field which the States 
have traditionally occupied." See, e.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. 
at 484-86. 
 
While the defendants argue that the pr ocedural 
differences in question both indicate congressional intent to 
preempt the plaintiffs' state law claims and demonstrate 
that state law in this case "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress," we find it mor e likely that these 
differences demonstrate a congressional attempt to limit the 
relief available to plaintiffs underS 36(b). In enacting S 36(b) 
in 1970, Congress not only created a federal, private right 
of action previously unavailable under federal law, 
Congress also radically altered the legal standard under 
which the fairness and corresponding legality of mutual 
fund compensation arrangements had been evaluated. 
Consistent with Congress's intent in enactingS 36(b), the 
legal standard under which mutual fund compensation 
arrangements are evaluated under S 36(b) is markedly more 
"plaintiff-friendly" than the "corporate waste" standard 
applied by most state courts prior to 1970. In or der to 
temper the radical change in the legal standar d under 
which the fairness and corresponding legality of mutual 
fund compensation agreements would be evaluated under 
S 36(b), Congress instituted various pr ocedural limitations. 
These procedural limitations are the same procedural 
differences highlighted by the defendants as evidence that 
state law in this case "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objectives of Congress." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Defendants argue in their brief that the ICA generally and S 36(b) 
specifically demonstrate a "Congressional desire to replace . . . 
ineffective 
state laws with a `national' uniform  standard." Brief for Appellees at 13 
(emphasis added). As a threshold matter , we note that the defendants 
have cited no authority that indicates or even suggests that a desire for 
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Although the defendants argue to the contrary, we 
conclude that these procedural differ ences and limitations 
do not indicate that state law in this case "stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purpose and objectives of Congress," but rather show that 
Congress realized that S 36(b)'s sweeping change in the 
legal standard, under which the fairness of mutual fund 
compensation agreements would be evaluated, necessitated 
corresponding limitations in the relief available. 
 
In addition, we note that the defendants' reliance on 
recent the Supreme Court preemption decisions in United 
States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), Geier v. American 
Honda Motor Co., 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000), Nor folk Southern 
Ry. v. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. 1467, 1477 (2000), and Crosby 
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 2000 WL 775550 (June 
19, 2000) is misplaced. The Supreme Court's holding in 
Locke that Title II of the Ports and W aterways Safety Act 
(PWSA) preempts conflicting state law was based primarily 
on the doctrine of stare decisis. Many of the issues raised 
in Locke were raised, analyzed and addr essed by the 
Supreme Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 
151 (1978). To the extent that the subsequent enactment of 
the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) modified or amended the Ports 
and Waterways Safety Act, the relevant statutory history 
explicitly states that the OPA "does not disturb the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
435 U.S. 151 (1978)." Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting 
H.R. CON. REP. NO. 101-653, at 122 (1990)). More 
importantly, Locke is distinguishable fr om the case now 
before us because Congress, in enacting the OPA and 
PWSA, did not "legislate[ ] . . . in afield which the States 
have traditionally occupied." Thus, the pr esumption against 
preemption present in this case did not exist in Locke. 
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147-48. 
 
In Geier, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners' 
state tort claim, based on a lack of an automobile airbag, 
conflicted with the objectives of Federal Motor V ehicle 
Safety Standard 208 and therefore was preempted by the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. See 
Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1922. However, Geier, like Locke, is 
distinguishable from the case before us because the Court 
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in Geier relied upon federal statutory language and the 
corresponding legislative history, concluding that state law 
stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purpose and objectives of Congress." 
 
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Norfolk 
Southern Ry. v. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. 1467, 1477 (2000) and 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 2000 WL 775550 
(June 19, 2000) are distinguishable. The Court in Norfolk 
held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, in 
conjunction with various regulations pr omulgated under 
the act, preempted state law tort claims stemming from a 
railroad's failure to maintain adequate warning devices at 
crossings where federal funds were used to install such 
warning devices. See Norfolk, 120 S. Ct. at 1474-77. 
However, the Supreme Court's holding in Norfolk, like its 
holding in Locke, was based primarily on the doctrine of 
stare decisis. See Norfolk, 120 S. Ct. at 1474-77; CSX 
Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). Moreover, 
Norfolk addressed the issue of "express preemption," not 
"conflict preemption" and thus is inapposite to the case 
now before us. 
 
The Court in Crosby also held that a Massachusetts law 
barring state entities from buying goods and services from 
companies doing business in Burma was pr eempted by a 
subsequent federal law imposing mandatory and 
conditional economic sanctions on Burma. In contrast to 
Norfolk, Crosby clearly pr esented a question of "conflict 
preemption." However, like Locke  and Geier, Crosby is 
distinguishable because the Court in Crosby relied upon 
the language of three clear and unambiguous federal 
statutory provisions in concluding that state law stood "as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purpose and objectives of Congress." In addition, in 
enacting the federal statutory provisions at issue in Crosby, 
Congress sought to affect national for eign policy: not "a 
field which the States have traditionally occupied." Thus, 
the presumption against preemption pr esent in this case 
did not exist in Crosby. 
 
Finally, we note that the party claiming preemption bears 
the burden of demonstrating that federal law pr eempts 
state law. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
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238, 255 (1984); Buzzard v. Roadrunner T rucking, Inc., 966 
F.2d 777, 780 (3d Cir. 1992). Her e, the defendants bear the 
burden of demonstrating that S 36(b) of the ICA preempts 
the plaintiffs' state law claims for br each of fiduciary duty 
and deceit. In order to prevail under a theory of "conflict 
preemption," the defendants must demonstrate that the 
state law at issue in this case "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and 
objective of Congress" as set forth in S 36(b). Because we 
conclude that the defendants have failed to make this 
showing, we hold that the plaintiffs' state law claims are 




In arguing that the plaintiffs' state law claims for breach 
of fiduciary duty and deceit are preempted by S 36(b) of the 
ICA, the defendants fail to point to any language, either in 
S 36(b) itself or in the accompanying legislative history that 
demonstrates that Congress intended S 36(b) to preempt, 
and thereby displace, the plaintiffs' state law claims. The 
defendants also fail to demonstrate how state law in this 
case "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress." 
We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs' state law claims are 
not preempted by S 36(b). We will reverse the District 
Court's grant of judgment and remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings.19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. In so ruling, we note that the disposition of this appeal does not 
hinge on the merits of plaintiffs' state law claims. Rejection of the 
defendants' arguments in favor of preemption in no way suggests that 
the plaintiffs should ultimately prevail on the merits. We hold only that 
S 36(b) of the ICA does not preempt the plaintiffs' state law claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty and deceit. 
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STANTON, District Judge, Dissenting: 
 
For the reasons stated in the District Court's opinion, 
Green v. Fund Asset Management, L.P. , 53 F.Supp.2d 723 
(D.N.J. 1999) which I would affirm, I r espectfully dissent. 
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